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ACCOMMODATION OF FEDERAL PATENTS AND THE
STATE INTEREST IN TRADE SECRETS
Patents evince a certain bittersweet duality: they serve as induce-
ments to invention which the Government encourages and con-
versely as monopolies which federal courts subject to the tightest
restraints.' The balance between those two conflicting characteris-
tics of federal patent policy increasingly has reflected judicial aver-
sion to monopoly, resulting in constraint of the patent privilege.
Where that posture has intersected legitimate state interests, the
patent policy generally has emerged dominant. Emphasizing the
promotion of competition in new ideas, the Supreme Court has
found that the federal interest in restricting patent privileges
preempts certain state efforts to promote fair and equitable conduct
by providing patent-like protections in the sale, licensing, and use
of new discoveries. 2
The recent Supreme Court decision in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp.,3 suggests that the judicial attitude favoring federal preemp-
tion is changing. Presented with the opportunity to preempt state
trade secret laws that allegedly conflicted with federal patent pol-
icy, the Court found instead that no conflict existed. The failure to
take the final jump, toward which earlier decisions incessantly had
progressed, indicates a deemphasis of the antimonopoly aspects of
patent policy when state interests also are involved. The judicial
development of the federal antimonopoly patent policy, including
the trend toward federal preemption of state actions in the patent
field, provides the framework for the assessment of the importance
of Kewanee to patent law.
The Supreme Court has developed the federal antimonopoly pat-
ent policy though its decisions in three categories of patent cases.
1. Patents are strictly construed, United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942),
patent monopolies are limited only to the patented item, Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger
Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942), and patents do not create an exemption from antitrust laws if the
patents are abused, IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
2. See, e.g., Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (localrules ofestoppel
cannot excuse antitrust violations stemming from patent law abuses).
3. 94 S. Ct. 1879 (1974). For other discussion of Kewanee and its predicted impact, see
Panel Discussion, Spring Meeting, May 16, 1974, 1974 A.P.L.A. BuLL. 316; Wydick, Trade
Secrets: Federal Preemption in Light of Goldstein and Kewanee, 55 J. PAT. OF. So'y 734
(1973); Note, Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corporation: Can Trade Secrets Survive It?,
25 BAYLOR L. Ray. 519 (1973); Note, Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of Inven-
tions Meeting Judicial Standards of Patentability, 87 HARv. L. REV. 807 (1974). [hereinafter
cited as Patent Preemption]; 15 B.C. NO. & Com. L. Rv. 137 (1973); 4 Mmprns ST. U.L.
Rav. 204 (1973); 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 612 (1973).
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Each group presents one key issue, although the complexity of some
cases causes them to fall within more than one classification. The
first category encompasses those cases which require the basic de-
termination of whether a patent issued by the United States Patent
Office is valid,4 and if valid, whether it has been infringed unlaw-
fully. Federal courts traditionally have interpreted the patent re-
quirements strictly to protect the public against a patent monopoly
attaching to a development that properly belongs in the public do-
main.5 Guided by that attitude, the Supreme Court has decided
against the patentee in the overwhelming majority of cases before
it.,
The second category of patent cases reaching the Supreme Court
focuses upon whether alleged misconduct, either by a patentee or
his licensee, violates the Sherman or Clayton antitrust acts. Other
4. Congress has established the basic criteria upon which a determination of validity rests:
utility, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970); novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970); and nonobviousness, 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 (1970). Section 101 provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
(emphasis supplied). Thus an inventor is not required to submit inventions as a matter of
law, and neither does the Patent Office have to issue a patent as a matter of right. Section
102 provides: "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless- (a) the invention was known
or used by others. . . before the invention thereof by the applicant. . . ." The application
of a potential patentee, therefore, can be denied if his invenfion has been utilized by a party
relying on trade secret laws to protect the invention, and the use by the other party is
sufficiently known by those examining the patent application.
The Supreme Court has interpreted further the congressionally enunciated criteria con-
cerning the validity of a patent. See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S.
518 (1972) (combinations of known inventions in novel way patentable); Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (standards of obviousness defined).
5. "[T]he 'rights and welfare of the community must be fairly dealt with and effectually
guarded' . . . the prerequisites to obtaining a patent are strictly observed, and when the
patent has issued the limitations on its exercise are equally strictly enforced." Sears, Roebuck
& Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964). See also United States v. Masonite Corp., 316
U.S. 265, 280 (1942).
6. The Supreme Court has invalidated the patent in over 80 percent of all infringement
actions appealed to the Court. A patentee fares only slightly better before the courts of
appeals which have rejected 72.1 percent of the patents litigated between 1966 and 1968.
Milgrim, Sears to Lear to Painton: Of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 17, 31
(1971). The history of patent invalidations over the past several decades illustrates the devel-
oping antimonopoly patent posture of the Supreme Court. From 1925 to 1929, the Court held
invalid only 29 percent of all patents litigated there. From 1950 to 1954, the Court invalidated
all patents reaching it. Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle: A Survey, 55 Nw.
U.L. REv. 437, 456 (1960). Considering the Court's posture, Justice Jackson remarked:
"[T]he only patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to get its hands
on." Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 12-27, 44 (1970); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1970). See, e.g., United States v.
Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948);
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cases of alleged misuse focus upon whether a licensor, in setting
conditions for licensing his patent, exceeds the terms of the monop-
oly grant which the patent statutes afford him.8 Such excesses in-
clude attempts to collect royalties on a patent beyond the life of the
patent' or on claims not within the grant,10 and attempts to tie the
use of unpatented materials into a patent license,"
Although decisions on the merits may involve issues presented in
the first two categories, the Supreme Court cannot resolve the key
issue in the third group of cases, the preemption cases, simply by
evaluating compliance with federal statutory requirements. The
decisive element in these cases is the conflict between state interests
in protecting new discoveries from unfair or destructive competition
and federal interests in regulating patents to preserve competition.
In resolving that conflict in the third category of patent cases, the
Court, prior to Kewanee, consistently had sacrificed state efforts
designed to redress perceived competitive evils whenever those state
interests presented even a slight dampening effect on competition.
Erosion of the estoppel doctrine 2 and nullification of unfair compe-
tition statutes illustrate the sacrifice of state efforts designed to
protect the sale, licensing, and use of new discoveries.
As applied to new discoveries, the estoppel doctrine prohibited
the assignor of a patent right from attacking its validity against one
claiming under the assignment, even though the patent may have
had no validity against the remainder of the world.'3 The estoppel
doctrine embodies a state effort to promote equitable dealing in
inventions. Through the principle, a state can ensure that an assig-
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, rehearing denied, 321 U.S. 802 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, rehearing denied, 321 U.S. 802 (1944); Sola Elec. Co.
v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
8. A patent gives a patentee an assignable, inheritable grant for 17 years "of the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States
.... 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
9. See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 985 (1965).
10. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), on
remand, 418 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 321, rehearing denied, 401 U.S. 1015
(1971); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
11. See, e.g., Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637,
rehearing denied, 330 U.S. 854 (1947); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680, rehearing
denied, 321 U.S. 802 (1944).
12. See generally Cooper, Estoppel to Challenge Patent Validity: The Case of Private Good
Faith vs. Public Policy, 18 CAsE W. RFs. L. REv. 1122 (1967).
13. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 349
(1924).
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nor who violates the terms of the assignment cannot escape the
consequences when called to account for his wrongful actions. State
and lower federal courts applied the estoppel doctrine for years as
an expression of a state interest in the contractual relationship be-
tween the parties to an assignment and licensing agreement."
The Supreme Court first recognized and applied the doctrine of
estoppel to patent assignments in Westinghouse Electric & Manu-
facturing Co. v. Formica Insulation Co.' s Having applied the rule,
the Court immediately created an exception, holding that in an
infringement suit by an assignee, the assignor could show "the state
of the art" to "narrow or qualify the construction of the claims and
relieve the assignor from the charge.""6 The logic underlying that
judicially created exception appears questionable." Nevertheless,
without mentioning any federal patent policy that encourages com-
petition, the Court notched the first chink in the armor of estoppel.
In the decades since Westinghouse, the Supreme Court has come to
recognize free competition as a primary objective of judicial enforce-
ment of the patent laws and increasingly has viewed the estoppel
doctrine as a threat to that policy. The Court eroded the doctrine
during the 1940's in several decisions'" wherein it found that estop-
14. See, e.g., Cross Paper Feeder Co. v. United Printing Mach. Co., 220 F. 313 (D. Mass.
1915); Alvin Mfg. Co. v. Scharling, 100 F. 87 (D.N.J. 1900); Adee v. Thomas, 41 F. 342
(E.D.N.Y. 1890); Aberthaus Const. Co. v. Ransome, 192 Mass. 434, 78 N.E. 485 (1905). See
generally Manning v. Galland-Henning Pneumatic Malting Drum Mfg. Co., 141 Wis. 199,
124 N.W. 291 (1910).
15. 266 U.S. 342 (1924). The dispute involved a patent grant which an employee had
assigned to Westinghouse in accordance with his employment contract. The employee subse-
quently joined Formica which put into use a process that allegedly infringed the patent. The
Court recognized the following equitable principle: "Ain assignor of a patent right is es-
topped to attack the utility, novelty or validity of a patented invention which he has assigned
or granted as against any one claiming the right under his assignment or grant. As to the rest
of the world, the patent may have no efficacy and create no right of monopoly; but the
assignor cannot be heard to question the right of his assignee to exclude him from its use."
Id. at 349.
16. Id. at 350 (emphasis supplied). In so holding, the Court rejected several lower court
decisions that recognized a total estoppel. See, e.g., Foltz Smokeless Furnace Co. v. Eureka
Smokeless Furnace Co., 256 F. 847 (7th Cir. 1919); Chicago & A. Ry. v. Pressed Steel Car
Co., 243 F. 883, 887 (7th Cir. 1917); Siemens-Halske Elec. Co. v. Duncan Elec. Mfg. Co., 142
F. 157 (7th Cir. 1905).
17. The Court reasoned: "Otherwise the most satisfactory means of measuring the extent
of the grant the Government intended and which the assignor assigned would be denied to
the Court in reaching a just conclusion." 266 U.S. at 350-51. The Court was undeniably
correct in assuming that the most qualified person to attack the scope of a patent would be
the patentee. But the "most satisfactory means" of challenging validity is also through the
patentee. Apparently this logical inconsistency never manifested itself to the Court. See Scott
Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 253 (1945).
18. MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402, rehearing denied, 330 U.S.
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pel conflicted with the antimonopoly policy of the federal govern-
ment. 19
The death knell tolled two decades later in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,"0
when the Supreme Court expressly overruled the doctrine of licensee
estoppel. 21 The majority reasoned: "Surely the equities of the licen-
sor do not weigh very heavily when they are balanced against the
important public interest in permitting full and free competition in
the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain. '22
In his concurrence, Justice Black objected that the Court did not
sufficiently limit state activities in the patent field and argued that
the patent laws express a national policy "favoring free competition
and narrowly limiting monopoly. . . ." Beyond the issue of estop-
pel, the majority found the contractual requirement that the licen-
see continue to pay royalties while challenging a patent's -validity
to be economically wasteful and inconsistent with federal patent
policy.4 Thus the Court did not merely reject the licensee estoppel
doctrine in announcing the right to withhold royalties pending a
determination of validity; it provided a positive incentive for as-
saults upon patents by licensees.
853 (1947); Edward Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, rehearing
denied, 330 U.S. 853 (1947); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, rehearing
denied, 326 U.S. 811 (1945); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942).
19. The remarks of Chief Justice Stone indicate the Court's deemphasis of state efforts to
ensure fair and equitable dealings in discoveries: "The interest in private good faith is not a
universal touchstone which can be made the means of sacrificing a public interest secured
by an appropriate exercise of the legislative power. The patent laws preclude us from saying
that the patent assignment, which they authorize, operates to estop the assignor from assert-
ing that which the patent laws prescribe,.namely, that the invention of an expired patent is
dedicated to the public, of which the assignor is a member." Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus
Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 257, rehearing denied, 326 U.S. 811 (1945).
20. 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Lear had acquired the rights to a gyroscope system from Adkins,
an employee. The licensing agreement, finalized before the patent issued, provided that Lear
could terminate the contract if a patent were to be refused or if an issued patent were to be
held invalid subsequently. Six years passed before a patent was finally granted, but Lear,
believing the device to be unpatentable, halted royalty payments during the interim. In
defending the suit to recover withheld royalties, Lear sought to prove the patent invalid. The
Supreme Court of California rejected the invalidity defense, relying on the doctrine of estop-
pel. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882,.___, 435 P.2d 321, 325-26, 64 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549-50
(1967).
21. The Court also expressly overruled Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950), which had spoken of licensee estoppel as a general rule. 395 U.S.
at 671.
22. 395 U.S. at 670.
23. Id. at 677 (Black & Douglas, JJ., & Warren, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
24. The Court ruled that a determination on remand, rendering the patent invalid, would
relieve Lear from payment of royalties accruing after the patent issued. Id. at 674.
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During the hiatus in the assault on estoppel between the several
cases in the 1940's and Lear in 1969, the Supreme Court decided the
companion cases of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.2s and
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.2 Those decisions marked
a new and controversial effort to give greater effect to the competi-
tive character of the patent laws in the conflict with state unfair
competition statutes. 2 The Court framed the issue in classic
preemption terms: "The question in this case is whether a State's
unfair competition law can, consistently with the federal patent
laws impose liability for or prohibit the copying of an article which
is protected by neither a federal patent nor a copyright."2 Pursuant
to its analysis of the supremacy of federal patent laws, the Court
concluded that state unfair competition statutes could not prevent
the copying of items too lacking in novelty to be patentable;29 the
25. 376 U.S. 225, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
26. 376 U.S. 234, rehearing denied, 377 U.S. 913 (1964).
27. Although both cases focused upon patent infringement claims, the plaintiffs also al-
leged violation of the Illinois unfair competition law. ILL. Arm. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 312(2)
(Smith-Hurd 1974 Supp.). The federal district court held both patents invalid and conse-
quently denied the infringement claims. The court, however, granted relief under the unfair
competition law, reasoning that even though the patents were void, copies of the products
were sufficiently similar to the originals to cause confusion about the source of the items.
Sears, Roebuck &.Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 226 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 235 (1964). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
both decisions. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963); Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1963).
For a seminar on the effect of Sears and Compco, which produced no less than five distinct
evaluations of the cases' import, see Leeds, et al., Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?
64 COLUM. L. Ray. 1178 (1964).
28. Sears, Roebuck & Co- v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). In its brief analysis of the
supremacy of federal patent and copyright laws over conflicting state law, the Court stated:
"When state law touches upon the area of these federal statutes, it is 'familiar doctrine' that
the federal policy 'may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied' by the state law. This is
true, of course, even if the state law is enacted in the exercise of otherwise undoubted state
power." Id. at 229, citing Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
Although the Court's statement regarding preemption was settled law, Sola constituted ques-
tionable authority for its development because the Court decided that case essentially on
antitrust rather than patent grounds. See MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 329
U.S. 402, 411-13 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
29. The Court stated:
Obviously a State could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give a
patent on an article which lacked the level of invention required for federal
patents . . . .Just as a State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws
directly, it cannot, under some other law, such as that forbidding unfair compe-
tition, give protection of a kind that clashes with the objectives of the federal
patent laws.
. ..To allow a State by use of its law of unfair competition to prevent the
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states, however, still might compel labeling to avoid consumer de-
ception.5 " The thrust of the decisions, that a state unfair competi-
tion law cannot grant monopolies unavailable under federal stan-
dards, comports with the constitutional principle of federal preemp-
tion in patent regulation. The Court, however, made no effort to
balance legitimate state interests against the federal interest it was
protecting3
Having rejected the estoppel doctrine and nullified state unfair
competition statutes, the Supreme Court demonstrated an anti-
monopoly patent posture that negated state interests in protecting
new discoveries. The Court had whittled upon the equitable doc-
trine of estoppel in Lear; it had rendered unenforceable, as contrary
to federal patent policy, express contractual agreements waiving the
right to challenge patent validity and state laws discouraging unfair
methods of competition.32 The patent law originally was intended to
encourage invention and reward disclosure of new concepts for the
good of the public;33 however, the Supreme Court's construction of
the patent law increasingly has limited the statutory grants of mo-
copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to be patented
would be to permit the State to block off from the public something which
federal law has said belongs to the public. The resultwould be thatwhile federal
law grants only 14 or 17 years' protection to genuine inventions, States could
allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking in novelty to merit any patent
at all under federal constitutional standards. This would be too great an en-
croachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated.
376 U.S. at 231-32 (citations omitted).
30. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964). Merely requiring labeling, however, does not
solve the problem; since they need not recover development costs, competitors still can copy
and sell a product at a lower price than can the original producer.
31. See notes 61-63 infra & accompanying text.
32. The Court also has made procedural changes encouraging challenges to patent validity
in suits in the first category of patent cases. See notes 4-6 supra & accompanying text. In
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), the
Court eliminated the mutuality requirement for the application of collateral estoppel. The
Court earlier had held that an adjudication adverse to any or all claims of patent infringement
brought by a patentee did not preclude a suit against a different defendant on the same
claims. Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 644 (1936). Blonder-Tongue overruled Triplett to the
extent that the earlier case precluded a defendant from pleading estoppel when charged with
infringing a patent previously declared invalid. 402 U.S. at 350. Because a plaintiff in an
infringement action has ample opportunity to prove the validity of his patent, when chal-
lenged, the Blonder-Tongue holding was intended to prevent a multiplicity of suits on the
same issue. The decision, however, also forged another link in the chain that, in recent
decades, has constricted the legal protection of patent holders vis-a-vis the public in general
and more specifically, those persons contracting with patentees for the rights to their inven-
tions.
33. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 239 (1897).
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nopoly power. Its emphasis on competition left only trade secret
laws as a major device which the states could use to enforce a modi-
cum of fairness and equity in the area of commercial research and
development not governed by patentability standards.34 The Su-
preme Court itself in Lear questioned whether trade secret laws
affronted federal patent policy, but left the issue unresolved, 5 set-
ting the stage for Kewanee.
Kewaimee Oil Company brought an action in the United States
District Court for the Northern- District of Ohio, claiming that 40
processes used in growing a certain synthetic crystal were trade
secrets which Ohio statutes protected." The company 7 had spent
17 years and more than one million dollars in developing the crys-
tal,- which it opted to protect through secrecy rather than through
patents.39 Thereafter, several former Kewanee employees formed
the defendant Bicron Corporation. Although, while employed by
Kewanee, all had signed agreements not to disclose confidential
information or trade secrets, when Bicron duplicated the crystal in
just nine months, the information obtained by the former Kewanee
employees was assumed to be the basis for Bicron's successes.,'
34. Sometimes, inventors or manufacturers do not seek patents on inventions since, after
the statutory time period, the inventions enter the public domain, and even while the patent
is still in effect, infringing uses of some patented items, processes, or compounds may be very
difficult to detect in the course of manufacturing a separate product.
35. 395 U.S. at 660 n.9.
36. The particular statute states in part:
No person shall, with intent to deprive or withhold from the owner thereof the
control of a trade secret, or with intent to convert a trade secret to his own use
or the use of another, obtain possession of or access to an article representing a
trade secret.
.. .No person, having obtained possession of an article representing a trade
secret or access thereto with the owner's consent, shall convert such article to
his own use or that of another person, or thereafter without the owner's consent
make or cause to be made a copy of such article, or exhibit such article to
another.
OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 1333.51 (Page Supp. 1973).
37. Kewanee Oil Company (Kewanee) will be referred to hereinafter as the developer of
the crystals and processes at issue. In actuality, Harshaw Chemical Company, an unincorpor-
ated division of Kewanee, developed them and directly employed the individual defendants
before they joined Bicron Corporation. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 94 S. Ct. 1879, 1882
(1974).
38. Id.
39. Since Kewanee had employed the processes commercially for longer than one year, the
company may have been unable to receive federal patent protection at the time the suit arose.
Id. The United States Code provides: "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless... (b)
the invention was . . . in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent in the United States. . . ." 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
40. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074, 1076-77 (6th Cir. 1973).
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Kewanee therefore sought an injunction against the disclosure or
use of the processes by Bicron or its employees. The district court
found that 20 of the 40 processes qualified as trade secrets4' and
granted a permanent injunction to protect them.42 The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concurred in the district court's find-
ings of fact and application of Ohio law, but reversed upon finding
preemption by the federal patent law.45
41. "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of informa-
tion which. . . gives. . . an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing,
treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of custom-
ers." 4 RESTAT tENT oF TorS § 757, Comment b (1939).
Ohio follows the Restatement definition of a trade secret. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
94 S. Ct. 1879, 1883 (1974); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hargadine, 392 F.2d 9, 14 (6th Cir. 1968);
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 117 Ohio App. 493, 498,192 N.E.2d 99, 104 (1963), as does
every major commercial jurisdiction in the United States. Milgrim, supra note 6, at 18 n.5.
On the subject of trade secrets generally, see Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 Omo ST. L.J. 4
(1962).
42. 94 S. Ct. at 1882 (discussion of district court decision).
43. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973). The court of appeals
did not consider the broad question of whether state trade secret laws generally conflicted
with the policies of the patent laws. Limiting itself instead to the facts of the case at hand,
the court regarded the issue to be "whether a state trade secret law which protects an
invention which would be an appropriate subject for a patent under the Patent Laws of the
United States, and which has been used commercially for more than one year conflicts with
the policies and purposes of Article I, Section 8 (Clause 8) of the Constitution and the Patent
Laws adopted pursuant thereto." Id. at 1078-79. Finding that "the issue of preemption of the
field of protection of inventions by the Patent Laws of the United States hed] never been
directly or clearly presented to the Supreme Court," Id. at 1081, the court analyzed the
direction of Supreme Court decisions in the patent field and held that the Ohio trade secret
law, insofar as it afforded protection to the owner of a patentable device which had become
ineligible for a patent, directly conflicted'with the patent laws of the United States. Id. at
1086.
That decision brought the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit into conflict with four
other appellate court decisions on the issue of federal preemption of trade secret law. In Servo
Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934, rehearing
denied, 384 U.S. 914 (1966), after finding all of the allegedly infringed patents invalid, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found for the plaintiff because the Southern Railroad
had breached a confidence by disclosing Servo's device to General Electric. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit followed Servo in a decision containing a perceptive analysis of
the nature and purposes of trade secrets. Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chem., Inc., 410 F.2d
163 (5th Cir. 1969). Subsequently, another court of appeals affirmed the grant of a prelimi-
nary injunction that restrained a party from using another's trade secrets during an action
for unfair competition and patent infringement. Dekar Indus., Inc. v. Bissett-Berman Corp.,
434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971). Using reasoning which
foreshadowed that of the Supreme Court in Kewanee, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that trade secret protection remained viable despite Sears and Compco. Painton
& Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
Although deferring to the broad patent holding of Sears and Compco, the four courts of
appeals distinguished them on the premise that neither involved breaches of confidence. The
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The Supreme Court, however, reinstated the judgment of the
district court,44 stating unequivocally that "patent law does not pre-
empt trade secret law . . . ."5 The threshold question the Court
posed was "whether the states are forbidden to act at all in the area
of protection of the kinds of intellectual property which may make
up the subject matter of trade secrets."46 Relying heavily on
Goldstein v. California," the majority resolved that issue in favor
of the states. Having determined that the states may accord protec-
tion to trade secrets generally, the Court turned to the specific issue
of "whether [the Ohio] law 'stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress.' "48 While acknowledging that "[t]he patent law does not
explicitly endorse or forbid the operation of trade secret law,"" the
majority recognized that "if the scheme of protection. . . respect-
ing trade secrets 'clashes with the objectives of the federal patent
laws,' then the state law must fall." 0
Analyzing whether such a clash existed, the Court adopted the
three divisions which Judge Friendly had used to categorize new
discoveries in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc.5' The Court first de-
clared that, because of congressional inaction in the area, the states
are free to extend trade secret protection to materials in the first
category, those not subject to patent protection.-2 The Court also
courts of appeals reasoned that trade secret laws serve the sole purpose of protecting informa-
tion disclosed in confidence whereas the state law struck down in Sears and Compco had a
much broader application, prohibiting any duplication of products in the public domain to
avoid confusion about the source of the products. For a reaction to the court of appeals
opinion in Kewanee, see Wydick, Trade Secrets: Federal Preemption in Light of Goldstein
and Kewanee, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soa'y 734 (1973); Note, Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron
Corporation: Can Trade Secrets Survive It?, 25 BAYLOR L. Ray. 519 (1973); Patent Preemp-
tion, supra note 3; 15 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Ray. 137 (1973); 4 Mausms ST. U.L. Rav. 204
(1973); 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 612 (1973).
44. 94 S. Ct. at 1892.
45. Id. at 1891.
46. Id. at 1884.
47. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). See note 67 infra & accompanying text.
48. 94 S. Ct. at 1885.
49. Id.
50. Id. (citation omitted).
51. 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971). The categories consist of devices that are clearly unpatenta-
ble, those about which the inventor may harbor legitimate doubts regarding patentability,
and those which are clearly patentable. The Court in Kewanee not only adopted the three
analytical categories, but also appeared to adopt the court of appeals' resolution of the
preemption issue as well.
52. Since the patent laws clearly offer nothing to the owner of an unpatentable invention,
"[a]bolition of trade secret protection would . . . not result in increased disclosure to the
public of discoveries in the area of nonpatentable subject matter." 94 S. Ct. at 1887. The
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evinced a belief that trade secret laws would provide no incentive
to avoid reliance on the patent laws for inventions of uncertain
patentability: "In most cases of genuine doubt as to patent validity
the potential rewards of patent protection are so far superior to
those accruing to holders of trade secrets, that the holders of such
inventions will seek patent protection, ignoring the trade secret
route. '5 3 In addition, the abolition of trade secret protection would
increase reliance on, and thus applications for, patents, possibly
resulting in the issuance of numerous weak patents," a consequence
the Court considered best avoided." For those reasons the majority
thought that removal of trade secret protection from "the doubtfully
patentable invention is . . . likely to have deleterious effects on
society and patent policy. . . [not] balanced out by the specula-
tive gain which might result. ... "I'
As no conflict existed in the first two categories of discoveries, the
only possible conflict between federal patent laws and state trade
secret statutes lay in the third area, the clearly patentable discover-
ies. Through the Court's analysis the issue narrowed to that ad-
dressed by the court of appeals: "whether those items which are
proper subjects for consideration for a patent may also have avail-
able the alternative protection accorded by trade secret law." 1 As
with the questionably patentable invention, the Court believed that
the less reliable trade secret protection would provide insufficient
incentive to avoid the patent system. Because "[tirade secret law
provides far weaker protection in many respects than the patent
law," the Court reasoned that an inventor who could obtain a patent
would not risk trying to maintain secrecy. 5 As for those.who might
Court reasoned that, because patent applications are held in confidence until approved,
"[t@he mere filing of applications doomed to be turned down by the Patent Office will bring
forth no new public knowledge or enlightenment. . . ." Id. at 1888.
53. Id. at 1889. On the other hand, the trend of Supreme Court decisions, by raising the
standards of invention and thereby decreasing the prospects of patentability, may induce
inventors to accept certain risks of secrecy in spite of its inherent difficulties. Klein, supra
note 6, at 455. See Brief for National Patent Council, Inc. for itself as Amicus Curiae and
representing National Small Business Association, Inc., at 3.4, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 94 S. Ct. 1879 (1974). See Patent Preemption, supra note 3, at 821-22.
54. 94 S. Ct. at 1889. Standards of patentability are notoriously less in the Patent Office
than in the courts. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). See Reynolds,
The Standard of Invention in the Patent Office, Diwurics OF THE PATEr SysTEM 3 (W. Bell
ed. 1960).
55. 94 S. Ct. at 1889.
56. Id. at 1889.90.
57. Id. at 1887.
58. Id. at 1890. "[1]t is a rare case, especially in today's technology, where a trade secret
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opt for trade secret protection, the majority saw little danger "that
scientific or technological progress will be impeded" since "[i]f
something is to be discovered at all, very likely it will be discovered
by more than-one person."' , The Court thereupon concluded "that
the extension of trade secret protection to clearly patentable inven-
tions does not conflict with the patent policy of disclosure."8
In harmonizing the federal patent laws and state trade secret
statutes; the Court in Kewanee appears to portend basic changes in
its attitude toward the patent laws. An assessment of the impact
Kewanee will make upon patent policy requires reading the case
from the perspective of both past Supreme Court opinions establish-
ing patent law preemption and other recent patent and copyright
decisions acknowledging state interests in protecting discoveries.
The Kewanee opinion demonstrates a willingness to accommodate
important state interests with federal patent law rather than merely
to nullify the offending state law, as in Sears and Compco.5 ' Only
can outlast the 17 year life of a patent." Brief for the New York Patent Law Association as
Amicus Curiae at 21, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 94 S. Ct. 1879 (1974).
59. 94 S. Ct. at 1890.
60. Id. at 1891. Because no conflict exists between the state and federal laws and because
it "could well create problems serious for state courts," the Court rejected the theory of partial
preemption, that the patent laws preempt trade secret laws only in the area of patentable
discoveries. For a'justification of partial preemption as a viable solution to the conflict
between trade secret statutes and patent law, see Patent Preemption, supra note 3. The Court
in Kewanee decreed, however, that undir the patent law of the United States, "In]either
complete nor partial pre-emption of state trade secret law is justified." 93 S. Ct. at 1891. That
holding seemed to comport with the interests of the majority of the patent community. Of
the 18 Amicus briefs filed in the case, 17 sought reversal or modification of the court of
appeals. Among those were the following: American Bar Association, Bar Association of the
District of Columbia, Ohio State Bar Association, American Patent Law Association, New
York Patent Law Association, American Chemical Society, Manufacturing Chemists Associa-
tion, Association for Advancement of Invention & Innovation, Licensing Executives Society,
Electronic Industries Association, United States Chamber of Commerce, Budd Co., Bur-
roughs Corp., Optical Coating Laboratories, Inc., R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., Rohr Indus-
tries, Inc., and Southwire Co. In addition a supplemental brief was filed by the United States
urging reversal because trade secret law had not been shown to interfere with federal patent
policy, because trade secrets serve an economically useful function, and because partial
preemption would be unworkable. Only one amicus brief, that for the National Patent Coun-
cil, Inc., and the National Small Business Association, was filed in support of the court of
appeals decision.
61. Justice Douglas recognized the departure in Kewanee from the trend of Supreme Court
decisions regarding the federal and state powers concerning discoveries: "Today's decision is
at war with the philosophy of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. and Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc... . We held that when an article is unprotected by a patent state law
may not forbid others to copy it, because every article not covered by a valid patent is in the
public domain. Congress in the patent laws decided that where no patent existed, free compe-
tition should prevail. . ... 93 S. Ct. at 1892-93 (dissenting opinion) (citations omitted).
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Justice Harlan, in his concurrence in those two cases, attempted to
accommodate the states' position.2 By narrowly construing the
state statute, Harlan would have conformed state interests in foster-
ing fair competition to the federal patent policy because
"[v]indication of the paramount federal interest at stake does not
require a State to tolerate. . . predatory business practices . 3 The
Court's decision in Kewanee demonstrates that the majority
adopted Harlan's recognition that states can regulate competition
concerning discoveries to ensure fairness among competitors and
that such state action, even though somewhat hindering free compe-
tition, need not be precluded.
Together with Kewanee, two other cases illustrate a trend in the
Supreme Court toward accommodation of state efforts to promote
equitable dealings in discoveries. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Lai-
tram Corp.4 demonstrates that the four most recently appointed
justices are concerned with the subordination of equitable principles
in patent cases. Citing the "historical antipathy to monopoly,"5 5 the
majority found no infringement, but the case is interesting for the
views of the four dissenters. They reflected a common concern about
both the majority's too-strict antimonopoly standard and the sacri-
fice of equitable principles in the Court's application of patent law,
arguing: "[Tihe result is unduly to reward the artful competitor
who uses another's invention in its entirety and who seeks to profit
thereby." 6 Goldstein v. California7 indicates more clearly a devel-
62. Although not finding sufficient proof for either case to come within his interpretation,
Justice Harlan would have read the state statute narrowly and would have applied it only
when the copying of another's productwas "undertaken with the dominant purpose and effect
of palming off one's goods as those of another or of confusing customers as to the source of
such goods." Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 239 (1964) (concurring
opinion). Harlan's interpretation would permit state interests to intrude slightly on the fed-
eral policy of restraining patent monopolies, but the intrusion would be minor compared with
the deterrent effect it would have on certain types of unconscionable conduct.
63. Id.
64. 406 U.S. 518, rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972). Laitram alleged that the Deep-
south Packing Company infringed its combination patent by manufacturing the component
parts of its device, assembling all but the two parts which formed the innovation on which
the patent was based, then selling the package abroad where the remaining enclosed parts
were easily added to the assembly. The Supreme Court ruled that Deepsouth did not make
the device within the meaning of the patent law because "a combination patent protects only
against the operable assembly of the whole and not the manufacture of its parts." 406 U.S.
at 528.
65. 406 U.S. at 530.
66. Id. at 532-33 (dissenting opinion).
67. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). The case concerned a California criminal statute which proscribed
copying recorded tapes or phonograph.records with intent to sell the copies without consent
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oping trend to accommodate state interests. Cited with approval in
Kewanee," the Court in Goldstein conceded that valid state inter-
ests exist in the subject matter of copyrights, an area in which the
federal government previously had asserted its paramount interest.
Against the background of earlier cases finding federal patent law
preemption and in the developing trend of recent cases accommo-
dating state interests, Kewanee suggests a deemphasis of the anti-
monopoly character of the patent law when state interests are in-
volved. The opinion defines patent law objectives as encouraging
public disclosure of new ideas and preventing state action which will
permit removal of intellectual property from the public domain. 9
The Court summarily rejected Justice Douglas' belief that anything
not patented or copyrighted is available for public use,7" declaring:
"By definition a trade secret has not been placed in the public
domain." 7' Although the Supreme -Court historically had encour-
aged competition in the field of new developments by strictly pre-
venting the removal of intellectual property from the public do-
main,7 2 in Kewanee it gave only cursory treatment to the issue, an
of the owner of the master recording. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 653(h) (West 1970). The defen-
dant alleged that the law conflicted with the patent clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, and
copyright statutes, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970), claiming that "Congress intended to allow
individuals to copy any work which was not protected by a federal copyright." 412 U.S. at
551.
The Supreme Court turned to the Federalist and found that states were not prohibited from
exercising their jurisdiction unless the Constitution expressly granted exclusive authority to
the national government, denied it to the states, or "where it granted an authority to the
Union, to which a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally
contradictory and repugnant." THE FEDEnAuST No. 32, at 241 (B. Wright ed. 1961), quoted
in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 553 (1973). The Court then reasoned that the purpose
of the copyright law was to relieve authors, desiring to protect their work in all states, from
securing copyrights in each. The federal law consequently was not exclusive, but permitted
local protection of "writings" of local interest. 412 U.S. at 556.58. Admitting that Congress
has the authority to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in the copyright field, the Court deter-
mined that Congress had not asserted its full authority at the time the case arose because an
artist could not obtain a copyright for a record. The Court rejected the argument that the
failure by Congress to exercise its authority indicated an intent to leave recordings unpro-
tected. Id. at 561-68.
68. 94 S. Ct. at 1887.
69. Id. at 1886.
70. Id. at 1892-93 (dissenting opinion).
71. Id. at 1887 (citation omitted).
72. The Court most clearly articulated the policy against allowing patents for ideas in the
public domain in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 233 (1964). In Sola Elec. Co.
v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942), the Court reasoned that if the patent was invalid,
a state-allowed license limiting use of the product would sanction a monopoly in violation of
the Sherman Act. In Lear, the Court brought together the two aspects of the antimonopoly
character of the patent laws, preservation of ideas in the public domain and the corresponding
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approach suggesting the extent to which the opinion departs from
the earlier emphasis on competition.
Through its opinion in Kewanee, the Court has demonstrated a
willingness, previously not apparent, to find an accommodation be-
tween the federal patent laws and state interests. For the first time,
the Court weighed the policy behind the state law and found that
it could be harmonized with that of the patent laws. The legalistic
approach which heretofore had been applied in every confrontation
with state law was abandoned. The failure of the Court, however,
to address the inherent tension between the monopoly under the
patent laws and the preservation of free competition limits the opin-
ion's impact on federal patent policy. Because of that omission, the
enforcement of a federal antimonopoly policy will continue una-
bated as part of the patent law where state interests in preventing
competitive evils are unaffected. Where such state interests are a
factor, however, Kewanee indicates that the Court no longer will
apply the legalistic approach advocated by Justice Douglas, but
instead will attempt to achieve a balance between state and federal
interests unless they are totally irreconcilable.
freedom from restraint of trade. The opinion stressed that the public interest in full and free
competition in the use of ideas in the public domain required overriding the equities of the
licensor. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969). The Court earlier had applied similar
reasoning in Compco. Compeo Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
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